Rise of the "Reverse" False Claim & Proposed Rules from CMS on Reporting & Returning Overpayments
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Feature Article: The Rise of the "Reverse” False Claim And Proposed Rules from CMS on Reporting and Returning Overpayments IDC Quarterly | Volume 23, Number 4 (23.4.4) By: Tyler Robinson, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Springfield and Roger R. Clayton, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria
While providers enrolled in federal government healthcare
programs have long reconciled and returned overpayments through various ongoing
and post-payment audit and self-disclosure mechanisms, Congress has enacted
laws and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has proposed a
set of rules that have incredible and immediate implications with
respect to a provider’s obligation to expeditiously identify and return
government overpayments in order to avoid significant liability under
the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. This article details the
evolution of the FCA to encompass a provider’s retention of government
overpayments, Congress’s new 60-day deadline to report and return government
overpayments, and proposed rules from CMS that could forever change the manner
in which hospitals investigate and report government overpayments.
False Claims Act Background
The FCA has long been recognized by its supporters as the
single most effective tool the United States has to combat fraud being
perpetrated against the government. The United States Supreme Court has noted
that the FCA is "the primary vehicle [used] by the Government for recouping
losses suffered through fraud.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 792 (2000) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at
18 (1986)). The FCA was enacted by Congress in 1863 at the behest of President
Abraham Lincoln to redress fraud being perpetrated against the Union Army
during the Civil War. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8-10 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273-75. The FCA, sometimes referred to as "Lincoln’s
Law,” was enacted so the government could "recover monies from unscrupulous
contractors who sold the Union Army decrepit horses and mules in ill health,
faulty rifles and ammunition, and rancid rations and provisions.” Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Celebrates 25th Anniversary
of the False Claims Act Amendments of 1986 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-ag-142.html (last visited October
21, 2013).
Between 1986 and 2012, civil lawsuits filed pursuant to the
FCA have allowed the federal government to recoup more than $33 billion from
fraud perpetrators. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Div., Fraud Statistics –
Overview, October 1, 1987 - September 30, 2012 (Oct. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013). Between 2008 and 2012 alone, the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) reported an increase of 268 FCA lawsuits and
$2.3 billion in FCA recovery. Id. The influx of FCA lawsuits and
recovery has come by way of recent congressional amendments that have
strengthened FCA enforcement actions and by the formation of the Health Care
Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT). A combination of Medicare
Fraud Strike Force teams spread throughout the United States, HEAT was created
in 2009 by United States Attorney General Eric Holder and Health and Human
Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius for purposes of improving coordination of
FCA enforcement. Since the formation of HEAT, DOJ has utilized the FCA to
collect more than $9.5 billion in federal health care funds. Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1439.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
The FCA provides for both civil and criminal penalties
assessed against those who are found to have submitted a false claim to the
government knowingly. The FCA, also referred to as a "whistleblower” statute,
permits a private individual called a "Relator” to file a lawsuit in the name
of and on behalf of the United States government against an entity or
individual whom the Relator believes is perpetrating fraud against the United
States government. If the Relator’s lawsuit, characterized as a "qui tam”1
lawsuit, is successful, the Relator is entitled to an award of up to 30 percent
of the judgment or settlement,2 plus costs and attorneys’ fees. See
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
Congress’s 1986 Amendments
The FCA has been the subject of significant congressional
amendments since its enactment in 1863, the most significant of which came by
way of Congress’s 1986 amendments. Among the significant changes the 1986
amendments made to the FCA were the increased financial incentive for
whistleblowers to file qui tam lawsuits from 15 percent to 30 percent
and the added whistleblower protections to prevent retaliation by the
whistleblower’s employer. The 1986 amendments also clarified that the FCA
extends liability to false claims designed to decrease an obligation to pay or
to transmit money or property to the government. H.R. Rep. 99-660, at 29
(1986). Classified as a "reverse” false claim theory of liability, the Senate
Judiciary’s Committee’s Report on the 1986 Amendments stated the following:
[T]he subcommittee added a clarification that an individual
who makes a material misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the
Government should be equally liable under the Act as if he had submitted a
false claim. The Justice Department testified that recent court rulings have
produced an ambiguity as to whether such "reverse false claims” were covered by
the False Claims Act, and the subcommittee agreed that such matters should be
addressable under the Act.
S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.
As a result of the 1986 amendments, the FCA extended
liability to any person or entity that "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation
to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” Pub. L. No. 99-562, §
2, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(7)) (emphasis added). Since its
inception, this theory of FCA liability has been characterized as a "reverse”
false claim "because it is designed to [re]cover Government money or property
that is knowingly retained by a person even though they have no right to it.”
S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 13-14 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430,
441.
After the 1986 amendments, plaintiffs relying on the
"reverse” false claim theory of FCA liability were stifled with inconsistent
and unpredictable rulings due, in large part, to the fact that the FCA did not
define the term "obligation.” In a commonly cited case addressing this issue,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in U.S. ex rel.
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190
F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 1999), concluded that "a reverse false claim action
cannot proceed without proof that the defendant made a false record or
statement at the time the defendant owed to the Government an obligation sufficiently certain to give rise to
an action of debt at common law.” According to the American Textile court,
FCA liability did not extend to "[c]ontingent obligations—those that
will arise only after the exercise of discretion of government actors.” U.S.
ex rel. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc., 190 F.3d at 738. The Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in American Textile was consistent with similar
holdings out of the United States Courts of Appeal for the Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits that interpreted "obligation” to mean "a fixed sum” or
"independent legal duty” to pay an amount that is "immediately due.” See,
e.g., U.S. ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189 (10th
Cir. 2006) (holding that, for there to be FCA liability, the defendant must
have an independent legal duty to pay the government at the time the
false statement is made); United States v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc., 131
F.3d 770, (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that, for there to be FCA liability, the
obligation "must be for a fixed sum that is immediately due”); United States
ex rel. Bain v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 657 (11th Cir.
1997) ("[T]he reverse false claims act does not extend to the potential
or contingent obligations to pay the government fines or penalties which have
not been levied or assessed . . . and which do not arise out of an economic
relationship between the government and the defendant . . . under which the
government provides some benefit to the defendant wholly or partially in
exchange for an agreed or expected payment . . . to . . . the government.”
(emphasis in original)).
Despite Congress’s attempt to broaden the "reverse” false
claims theory to encompass instances where an individual "makes a material
misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the Government,” S. Rep. No.
99-345, at 15, 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280,
5283, the theory was significantly weakened by courts instituting a narrow
interpretation of "obligation.” As a result, DOJ lobbied Congress for an
amendment to define "obligation” in such a way "that would correct those cases
that unduly narrowed the reverse false claim provision by holding or suggesting
that the term "obligation” encompasses only a duty to pay that is fixed in all
particulars, including the specific amount owed.” Letter from M. Faith Burton,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Appendix (April 1, 2009) (copy
on file with author). DOJ further sought to clarify that reverse false claim
liability exists "without any additional requirement of a false statement or
record.” Id. That is, an individual or entity can be held liable for the
act of knowingly retaining government funds to which the individual or entity
is not entitled without having to actually present a claim for government reimbursement.
FERA: Congress Attempts to Resolve the "Obligation” Paradox
On May 20, 2009, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement
Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA). Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). Among
other things, FERA significantly amended the FCA by defining "obligation” to
mean "an established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express
or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship,
from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from
the retention of any overpayment.” Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3)) (emphasis added). According to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the term "obligation” is meant to encompass "the
fixed amount debt obligation where all particulars are defined to the instance
where there is a relationship between the Government and a person that ‘results
in a duty to pay the Government money, whether or not the amount owed is yet
fixed.’” S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 14 (2009) (quoting Brief for United States at
24, United States v. Bourseau, No. 06–56741, 06–56743 (9th Cir. July 14,
2008)), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441. In plain terms,
regardless of whether a government overpayment has been quantified, a
provider’s knowledge of the overpayment gives rise to FCA liability under a
"reverse” false claims theory approach. That is, a provider knowingly retaining
a government overpayment, by itself, gives rise to FCA liability.
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report (the
Report), the inclusion of "retention of
an overpayment” into the definition of "obligation” was supported by DOJ. Id.
at 15. In fact, DOJ took an active role during the drafting stages of FERA when
it strongly encouraged Congress to include "overpayment” in the definition of
"obligation.” Letter from Brian Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Appendix 3 (Feb. 21, 2008), cited in S. Rep.
No. 111-10, at 15. According to the Report, a "reverse” false claim violation
is committed "once an overpayment is knowingly and improperly retained, without
notice to the Government about the overpayment.” S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 15
(2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 442. The Report noted,
however, that FCA liability is not designed to encompass cases where there
exists statutory or regulatory processes for reconciliation, "provided the
receipt of the overpayment is not based upon any willful act of a receipt to
increase the payments from the Government” to which the recipient was not
entitled. Id.
PPACA: Congress Injects a 60-Day Timeline to Report and Refund
Overpayments
Not even a year after it
passed FERA, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and Health Care and
Education Affordability Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2011) (collectively referred to as "PPACA”). Specifically, on March 23,
2010, Congress injected a 60-day timeline upon which providers and suppliers
(hereinafter "providers”) receiving government funds, such as Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursements, must report and refund government "overpayments” they
have received. According to Section 6402 of PPACA:
An overpayment must be reported and returned . . . by the
later of --
(A) the date which is 60 days after the date on which the
overpayment was identified; or
(B) the date any corresponding cost report is due, if
applicable.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2).
PPACA was clear that an overpayment retained after the
deadline for reporting and returning an overpayment is considered an
obligation, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3), for purposes of "reverse” false claims
liability under the FCA. To avoid inconsistent, narrow interpretations of the
term "overpayment,” Congress broadly defined "overpayment” to mean "any funds
that a person receives or retains under” Medicare or Medicaid to which the
person, "after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(B). Interestingly, Congress
did not define or clarify the phrase, "after applicable reconciliation.”
Presumably, Congress was accounting for the sophisticated cost report and
multifaceted reconciliation processes associated with Medicare that can take
months, if not years, to elicit a fixed or final amount in what CMS owes to the
provider or what the provider owes to CMS for a benefit year.
Nevertheless, after the enactment of PPACA, all health care
providers receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds are required to "report” and
"refund” any overpayments within 60-days from the date the overpayment is
"identified” or within 60-days after the due date of any applicable cost
report. Uncharacteristically, it took CMS almost two years to develop its
much-anticipated proposed regulations interpreting PPACA. Having failed to
finalize two previous sets of proposed rules relating to CMS’s ability to
recover overpayments in 1998, 63 Fed. Reg. 14506 (Mar. 25, 1998), and 2002, 67
Fed. Reg. 3662 (Jan. 25, 2002), PPACA reinvigorated CMS’s strive to reduce
fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Proposed Regulations from CMS: More Questions than Answers
On February 16, 2012, CMS published in the Federal Register a
set of proposed rules, establishing a new Subpart D in Part 401 of Title 42 of
the regulations and interpreting PPACA’s requirement that providers timely
report and return Medicare and Medicaid overpayments. 77 Fed. Reg. 9179-02
(Feb. 16, 2012). Among other things, CMS sought to clarify and define PPACA’s
key terms, such as when an overpayment is "identified” and the 60-day
"reporting and returning” timeline. Although CMS limited the scope of its
proposed rules to those providers and suppliers that participate in Medicare
Part A and Part B, CMS stated that it intended to address other stakeholders,
such as Medicare Advantage organizations (MAO), Medicare prescription drug
plans (PDP), and Medicaid managed care organizations (MCO), at a later date. 77
Fed. Reg. 9179-02, 9180 (Feb. 16, 2012). Notwithstanding the limited scope of
it proposed rules, CMS cautioned that all providers are obliged to comply with
the overpayment procedures set forth in PPACA. Id. at 9181.
"Identified”
With respect to when an overpayment is "identified,” CMS
proposed that "a person has identified an overpayment if the person has actual
knowledge of the existence of the overpayment or acts in reckless disregard to
deliberate ignorance of the overpayment.” Id. at 9182. CMS sought to
mirror the FCA’s definition of the terms "knowing” and "knowingly,” explaining
that the term "identified” should be interpreted in such a way as to give
providers "an incentive to exercise reasonable diligence to determine whether
an overpayment exists.” Id. Without such an incentive, the fear was that
providers would "avoid performing activities to determine whether an
overpayment exists, such as self-audits, compliance checks, and other
additional research.” Id.
Unfortunately, CMS was silent on the issue of whether there
is a monetary threshold upon which an overpayment has been "identified” and,
thus, must be reported and returned. CMS has focused on the existence of
the overpayment, not on the amount of the overpayment. This point is key
in that, presumably, the 60-day clock starts upon the awareness or deliberate
indifference of the existence of an overpayment—even if the provider has
not had the ability to quantify the amount of the overpayment. This
glaring omission from CMS begs the question as to what providers are to do when
they have identified the existence, but not the amount, of an
overpayment. Until the provider can quantify the amount of the overpayment,
providers should contact the entity to which they will inevitably submit their
report and refund and describe their efforts to identify the amount of
overpayment.
Reporting and Returning Deadlines
In cases where an overpayment is "identified,” CMS proposed a
regulation identical to that which was set forth in PPACA, wherein an
overpayment must be reported and returned by the later of: "(A) the date which
is 60 days after the date on which the overpayment was identified; or (B) the
date any corresponding cost report is due, if applicable.” 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7k(d)(2)(A)-(B). CMS explained that if the overpayment is
"claims-related,” the provider is required to report and return the overpayment
within 60 days of identification. If the claims-related overpayment is one that
is typically reconciled on the provider’s cost report, on the other hand, CMS
stated that the provider is permitted to report and return the overpayment by
the later of: (A) 60 days from the identification of the overpayment, or (B) 60
days from the date the cost report is due. 77 Fed. Reg. 9179-02, 9182 (Feb. 16,
2012). CMS cautioned that providers should not attempt to delay their reporting
and returning claims-related overpayments by waiting until their cost reports
are due.
In further explanation of a provider’s obligations under
PPACA, CMS theorized that there might be instances where a provider receives
information that it has potentially received an overpayment. In such cases, CMS
stated that providers have an obligation to undertake a "reasonable inquiry”
with "deliberate speed” to determine whether the overpayment exists. Id.
If, after receiving a notification of a potential overpayment, the provider
fails to undertake a "reasonable inquiry,” such a failure "could result in the
provider knowingly retaining an overpayment because it acted in reckless
disregard or deliberate ignorance of whether it received such an overpayment.” Id.
CMS provided an example for further illustration, wherein a provider received
an anonymous compliance hotline telephone complaint about a potential
overpayment that the provider received. According to CMS, so long as the
provider "diligently conducts the investigation” and "reports and returns any
resulting overpayments” within 60 days, the provider would satisfy its
obligations under the rules proposed by CMS. Id. If the provider failed
to investigate the complaint, the provider "may be found to have acted in
reckless disregard or deliberate indifference of any overpayment” in violation
of the FCA. Id.
To further illustrate, CMS provided a series of examples of
when a provider has an affirmative duty to investigate and return overpayments,
including the following:
● A provider . . . reviews billing or payment
records and learns that it incorrectly coded certain services, resulting in
increased reimbursement.
. . . .
● A provider of services . . . performs an
internal audit and discovers that overpayments exist.
● A provider . . . is informed by a government
agency of an audit that discovered a potential overpayment, and the provider .
. . fails to make a reasonable inquiry.
Id.
According to the rules proposed by CMS, once an overpayment
is identified, the provider is expected to send a written report to the
Department of Health and Human Services, or an intermediary, carrier, or
contractor, and provide an explanation of why it has received an overpayment.
77 Fed. Reg. 9179-02, 9181 (Feb. 16, 2012). CMS proposed adopting the
"self-reported overpayment refund process” currently in place for reporting
Medicare overpayments. CMS instructed providers to obtain forms available on
each Medicare Administrative Contractor’s website and to provide sufficient
information to allow the contractor to identify the affected claims. Id.
Among other things a provider must report, the provider must summarize the
following information: (1) the way in which the error was discovered; (2) a
description of the corrective action plan that was implemented to ensure that
the error does not occur again; (3) a refund in the same amount as the
overpayment; and (4) if the overpayment amount was determined using a
statistical sample, a description of the statistically valid methodology used
in the determination of the overpayment. Id.
In connection with its proposed rules, CMS anticipated that
there most certainly will be intersections between the 60-day deadline to
report and return overpayments and the existing procedures for providers to
self-disclose actual or potential violations to CMS through a Medicare
Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP) mechanism.3 CMS proposes
that a providers’ obligation to return overpayments would be suspended
when CMS acknowledges receipt of a disclosure made pursuant to a SRDP
mechanism. Id. at 9182-83. To be clear, the proposed rule from CMS does
not suspend a provider’s obligation to report overpayments within the
60-day deadline. CMS proposed a similar suspension of a provider’s obligation
to return overpayments when the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
acknowledges receipt of a submission pursuant to the OIG Self-Disclosure
Protocol (SDP), which is a procedure that providers currently utilize to report
self-discovered evidence of potential fraud. Unlike SRDP, however, CMS proposed
that once the provider notifies OIG through the use of a SDP, such notice
satisfies the "report” for purposes of the 60-day deadline. Id. at 9183.
10-Year Look-Back Period
As a final note, CMS proposed that overpayments must be reported
and returned if a person identifies the overpayment within 10 years of the date
the overpayment was received. Id. at 9184. CMS chose 10 years "because
this is the outer limit of the False Claims Act statute of limitations.” 77
Fed. Reg. 9179-02, 9184 (Feb. 16, 2012); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (providing that a civil action
arising under the FCA may not be filed under Section 3730 more than six years
after a Section 3729 violation occurred, or no more than three years after the
responsible U.S. official knew or should have known of the facts material to
the cause of action, but in any event may not be brought more than 10 years
after the date of the violation giving rise to the claim, whichever is later).
The rule proposed by CMS would amend 42 C.F.R. § 405.980(b), wherein there exists a one-year
claims reopening period for "any reason” and a four-year reopening period for
"good cause.” Under the existing regulations, Medicare claims can be reopened
only after four years "if there exists reliable evidence . . . that the initial
determination was procured by fraud or similar fault.” Id. §
405.980(b)(3). Under the rule proposed by CMS, overpayments may be reopened for
a period of 10 years after their submission. 77 Fed. Reg. 9179-02, 9184 (Feb.
16, 2012).
A critical issue that remains unclear is whether rules
proposed by CMS will encompass overpayments identified before March 23,
2010–PPACA’s effective date. That is, CMS was silent as to whether providers
are obligated to undertake reasonable inquiries to identify potential
overpayments for the last 10 years of government reimbursement or whether the
10-year period began on March 23, 2010. If courts follow the holding set forth
in U.S. ex rel. Stone v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 09 C 4319, 2011
WL 2669659 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2011), providers will not be held liable
for overpayments identified before the enactment of FERA and PPACA. As of this
writing, the Stone court is the only court to address whether
providers have an ongoing obligation to report and return Government
overpayments identified before the enactment of FERA and PPACA.
Significant Exposure: Penalties for Failure to Report and Return Overpayments
If a provider fails to report and return a government
overpayment within the 60-day timeframe contemplated by PPACA, the provider
could face liability under the FCA and under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law
(CMPL) statute. With respect to the FCA, the theory of liability associated
with the provider’s knowing retention of a government overpayment resides in 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). If a provider is found to have violated the FCA, the
provider could face damages up to three times the amount of single damages (the
actual amount of damages suffered by the government), between $5,500 and
$11,000 for each false claim, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
associated with instituting and litigating the FCA enforcement action. Id.
§ 3729(a)(1).
PPACA also amended the
CMPL to extend liability to instances where a provider "knows of an overpayment
. . . and does not report and return the overpayment” as required by PPACA’s
60-day rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(10).
If a provider is found to have violated the CMPL, the CMPL provides for a civil
monetary penalty of three times the total amount of reimbursement the provider
received without regard to whether the provider was lawfully entitled to a
portion of the proceeds. Id. In addition, the CMPL provides for varying
administrative civil penalties for each false claim and possible
exclusion from Medicare. Id.
Conclusion
While the rules proposed by CMS are not yet final, PPACA’s
60-day deadline for reporting and returning government overpayments has been
the law since March 23, 2010. In light of the significant exposure providers
will encounter if found liable under the FCA or CMPL, providers should immediately
institute policies and procedures to field any potential complaints with
respect to potential Medicare overpayments, including the manner in which the
complaints are to be handled and who is responsible for conducting the
investigation. To substantiate that the provider undertook a "reasonable
inquiry” as contemplated by CMS, providers should record the identities of the
employees undertaking the investigation and the information they gather.
Finally, as the number of healthcare qui
tam lawsuits and whistleblower rewards rise with each passing year,
providers should familiarize themselves with the latest Medicare statutes,
regulations, and CMS publications and bulletins relating to billing
requirements and consider integrating their legal team with their internal
audit or accounting team to routinely perform statistically valid reviews to
ensure compliance with these billing requirements. As a result of CMS
indicating in its proposal that it expects 8.5% of the total number of Medicare
providers to report three to five overpayments per year, providers should be
wary of failing to report any overpayments in a benefit year.
1 The term "qui tam” is short for the
Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,”
which means "who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as
his own.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000).
2 If the
United States government intervenes and proceeds with the lawsuit brought by a
Relator, the Relator is entitled to at least 15 percent but not more than 25
percent of the judgment or settlement. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). If the United
States government does not intervene, the Relator is entitled to at
least 25 percent but not more than 30 percent. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
3 The
Stark Law, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, is a strict liability statute that
prohibits a physician from referring Medicare patients to an entity for the
furnishing of "designated health services” if the physician or an immediate
family member of the physician has a "financial relationship” with the entity,
unless an exception applies. If a claim in violation of the Stark Law is
submitted to and paid by the government, the submitting provider could be
subject to, among other sanctions, liability in the amount of any payment
collected and civil penalties in the amount of $15,000 per service. 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn(g)(2). The Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP) allows providers to
self-disclose to CMS or the Office of the Inspector General actual or potential
violations of the Stark Law in order to have any chance of seizing the
possibility of reducing the amount of liability exposure. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.361. Once
a provider makes a SRDP disclosure and CMS acknowledges receipt of the same,
CMS suspends the provider’s obligation, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7k(d)(2)(A), to return the overpayment within 60 days until a settlement
agreement is entered, the provider of services or supplier withdraws from the
SRDP, or CMS removes the provider of services or supplier from the SRDP. CMS
Voluntary Self-Disclosure Protocol, OMB Control Number: 0938-1106, available
at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
About the Authors
Tyler Robinson is an associate in the Springfield
office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., where he is a member
of the firm’s healthcare practice group. His practice is focused on defending
health care providers against qui tam lawsuits filed pursuant to the
False Claims Act and similar state false claims laws. His experience includes
working in tandem with the U.S. Department of Justice on qui tam
litigation involving pharmaceutical and medical device companies, long term
care providers, and a wide variety of government contractors and federal
program participants, specifically regarding federal and state drug pricing
methodologies and reporting requirements. He has also counseled and advised
clients undergoing health care fraud and abuse investigations pursuant to the
Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law. Mr. Robinson received his undergraduate
degree from Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville in 2006 and a law degree
from Southern Illinois University School of Law in 2010, where he was a member
of the Journal of Legal Medicine. He is a member of the American Bar
Association, Defense Research Institute, Illinois Association of Defense Trial
Counsel, Illinois County Bar Association, and Sangamon County Bar Association.
Roger R. Clayton is a partner in the Peoria office
of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., where he chairs the firm’s
healthcare practice group. He also regularly defends physicians and hospitals
in medical malpractice litigation. Mr. Clayton is a frequent national speaker
on healthcare issues, medical malpractice, and risk prevention. He received his
undergraduate degree from Bradley University and law degree from Southern
Illinois University in 1978. He is a member of the Illinois Association of
Defense Trial Counsel (IDC), the Illinois State Bar Association, past president
of the Abraham Lincoln Inn of Court, president and board member of the Illinois
Association of Healthcare Attorneys, and past president and board member of the
Illinois Society of Healthcare Risk Management. He co-authored the Chapter on
Trials in the IICLE Medical Malpractice Handbook.
About the IDC
The Illinois
Association Defense Trial Counsel (IDC) is the premier association of attorneys
in Illinois who devote a substantial portion their practice to the
representation of business, corporate, insurance, professional and other
individual defendants in civil litigation. For more information on the IDC,
visit us on the web at www.iadtc.org.
Statements or
expression of opinions in this publication are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the association.
IDC Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 4. ©
2013. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. All Rights Reserved.
Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.
Illinois
Association of Defense Trial Counsel, PO Box 588, Rochester, IL 62563-0588,
217-498-2649, 800-232-0169, idc@iadtc.org
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